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STRIPPED DOWN LIKE A RUNNER OR ENRICHED BY
EXPERIENCE: BIAS AND IMPARTIALITY OF JUDGES
AND JURORS
MARTHA MINOW*
In phase one of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on
the nomination of Claren'ce Thomas to serve as Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, Thomas testified that as a
judge, "'You want to be stripped down like a runner," and "shed
the baggage of ideology.' "I One observer commented that Thomas
"painted a vivid image of a man methodically ridding himself not
only of old ideas and even the desire to form new ones, but also
of traits and attitudes that have formed the essence of his adult
personality." 2 At the same time, his supporters argued that a
man "who has experienced and overcome poverty and racial
discrimination in his own life brings an important and perhaps
irreplaceable perspective to the court."3 Beginning with his open-
ing presentation, Thomas presented himself as someone unbur-
dened by a political perspective, yet enriched by his experiences
of poverty and racial discrimination and therefore attentive to
the concerns of disadvantaged people.4
After the second phase of committee hearings following the
leak of Anita Hill's charges that Thomas sexually harassed her-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B., University of Michigan, 1975; M. Ed.,
Harvard University, 1976; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979. A version of this Essay was
delivered as the James Gould Cutler Lecture at the Marshal-Wythe School of Law at
the College of William and Mary on October 21, 1991. A further discussion of related
issues appears in Martha Minow, Equalities, 88 J. PHiL. 633 (1991). The author would like
to thank Betsy Fishman, Marjorie Sheldon, and the editors of the William and Mary
Law Review for their fine assistance. Thanks also to Joe Singer, Elena Kagan, Frank
Michelman, Avi Soifer, and Elizabeth V. Spelman.
1. Linda Greenhouse, The Thomas Hearings: In Trying to Clarify What He Is Not,
Thomas Opens Question of What He Is, N.Y. TmIEs, Sept. 13, 1991, at A19 (quoting Judge
Clarence Thomas). At another point, responding to a question from Senator Dennis
DeConcini, Thomas said,
I think it's important for judges not to have ... baggage. I think.., it is
important for us ... to eliminate agendas, to eliminate ideologies. And when
one becomes a judge ... you start putting the speeches away. You start
putting the policy statements away. You begin to decline forming opinions
in important areas that could come before your court because you want to
be stripped down like a runner.
David Broder, Thomas Backs Democrats into a Corner, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1991, at 3.
2. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A19.
3. Broder, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A19.
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the portion that Thomas called a "high-tech lynching" 5-the ten-
sion over perspective and impartiality only became compounded.
Thomas explained that he had come to better and personally
understand the need for rights for the accused. 6 He emphasized
his own right to privacy and demonstrated deep concern about
the operation of racial stereotypes.7 Yet he also attacked liberal
interest groups and the press, as wellfas the Senate itself, for
staging the high-tech lynching. He conveyed his disrespect for
everyone responsible for the process.
Do these experiences render him less, or more, qualified for
the position he now serves on the United States Supreme Court?
Will he be able to strip himself of his anger toward the Senate
when he reviews questions of congressional intent? Will he be
able to assure litigants of his impartiality in sexual harassment
cases, in cases involving freedom of the press, or in cases ad-
dressing senatorial decisions?
These questions expose intense confusion about bias, imparti-
ality, knowledge, and experience. This confusion permeates con-
temporary American legal thought, especially concerning the
selection of judges and juries. The confusion is particularly pro-
nounced because the ultimate goal of fairness in our society
includes notions of representation as well as ideas of neutrality.
The jury is to reflect a fair cross-section of the community. s Yet
the very existence of peremptory challenges, which g'e litigants
the power to strike a certain number of participants from the
jury without having to state any reason,9 creates tension with
the goal of a cross-section in the very process of permitting the
parties some modicum of control over what they perceive to be
fair or advantageous at trial. The Supreme Court has ruled that
peremptory challenges affecting the composition of both civil and
criminal juries must not intentionally exclude participants on the
basis of race or gender so as to undermine the goal of a fair
cross-section of the community.10
5. 137 CONG. REC. S14,632 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
6. See Richard L. Berke, The Thomas Nominations: Thomas Backers Attack Hill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 1.
7. Id.
8. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (noting that the American concept
of jury trial contemplates jury drawn from cross-section of community); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding that conviction by unrepresentative jury violates
equal protection). Even judicial elections, as the Supreme Court ruled last year, are
governed by the Voting Rights Act. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
9. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). Challenges for cause more directly address the issue of bias. I focus here on the
use of peremptory challenges rather than challenges for cause in the shaping of juries.
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My goal in this Essay is to consider three contrasting views
of bias and their relationships to the ideal of fair representation
in the selection of juries and judges. As a nation, we seem to
want those who sit in judgment to have no axes to grind, no
prejudgments about the people or issues they confront. We also
want them to have the ability to empathize with others, to
evaluate credibility, to know what is fair in this world, not in a
laboratory. And we want jurors and judges to have, and to
remember, experiences that enable their empathy and evaluative
judgments. This ambivalence, I will suggest, reflects a misunder-
standing of the preconditions for impartiality and of the role of
fair representation in producing impartial jurors and panels of
judges. Common sense, case law, fiction, and even movies illu-
minate these questions.
I. Do WE KNOW BIAS WHEN WE SEE IT?
First, let me ask whether we know bias when we see it.
Consider the cartoon depicting a judge with a large nose and
mustache, looking down from the bench at a defendant with the
same nose and mustache. The judge declares: "Obviously, not
guilty."" This cartoon illustrates the usual meaning of bias. It
refers to an inclination, a predilection, that interferes with im-
partiality. A potential juror poses the danger of bias when he or
she is too close to the parties or the issue at hand. By knowing
the people involved, by having a direct stake in the proceeding,
or by having had a very similar kind of experience as the one
under scrutiny, the potential juror may lack or appear to lack
the distance necessary to judge fairly.
Normally, we think that a person is or appears to be biased
toward friends, family members, or business associates. This view
reflects a sharp departure from the early conception of a jury as
a group of people from a community who knew the parties and
who could serve as witnesses to give evidence about the dispute.12
It is one of those curious historical transformations-much like
the transformation of the term "jury of one's peers" from a
reference to nobles to a reference to random cross-sections of
society. The jury for Oliver North excluded anyone who had
11. Charles Barsotti, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 1988, at 55.
12. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23-24 (1986).
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followed or even heard about his testimony in the congressional
Iran-Contra hearings.l The jury included thus only members of
that odd group of people who were able to sequester themselves
from a major topic of broad public interest and discussion.
To be fair, this notion of removal reflects the desire to guard
against prejudice-to avoid those who prejudge the issues at
hand. A juror who has been exposed to pretrial publicity might
have or seem to have a view about the merits of the case or the
virtues and vices of one or more parties. The question remains,
however: how is bias to be tested? A majority of the Supreme
Court has recently ruled that the issue of bias in the face of
pretrial publicity is avoided when the jurors report to the court
that they think they can be fair.14 The jurors' subjective reflec-
tions may be one component of any proper impartiality inquiry,
but I wonder whether this is sufficient. A juror may not fully
understand either the meaning or the demands of impartiality;
the juror may miscalculate his or her ability to put aside knowl-
edge that could prejudice judgment. In addition, the simple
appearance of bias may damage the basic commitment to a fair
trial process.
Variations on such questions of evidence and proof abound. For
example, who has the burden of showing that a prospective juror
is actually prejudiced? In a homicide case, one juror attended
church with the mother of the decedent but was nonetheless
allowed to serve on the jury.15 A Supreme Court majority refused
to grant certiorari in the case despite Justice Marshall's dissent-
ing view that the defendant ought not to bear the burden of
showing actual prejudice when the probability of bias was so
great.' 6
Aside from such questions of proof, the first notion of bias
begins to emerge with some clarity. A juror may be or may seem
biased because of personal experience with the parties or expo-
sure to publicity about their conduct. That juror seems too close
to the matter at hand to render a fair and objective judgment.
Does this mean that no bias arises if the juror is in the opposite
situation? What if the juror is extremely far from the matter at
13. North Jury Selection Bogs Down: Public Familiarity with Him Poses Problem, Judge
Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989, at 1.
Thomas felt compelled to state that he had never discussed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), with anyone. See The Thomas Hearings: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the
Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A20.
14. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991).
15. Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898 (1986).
16. Id. at 901 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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hand in either personal experience or knowledge? Professor Lon
Fuller once discussed the danger that jurors called to judge a
sailor charged with threatening another with bodily harm would
not understand the mores of the waterfront and would attribute
too much to testimony that the defendant had said in the past
that he would "'stick a knife in [someone's] guts and turn it
around three times.' ",17 Is it possible to risk actual bias, or its
appearance, by having a total absence of experience or knowledge
of the issue or evidence at hand? To be able to evaluate state-
ments of witnesses, a jury needs sufficient knowledge of the
witnesses' worlds to place their statements in context. Moreover,
to be able to render judgment, jurors need sufficient knowledge
of the life experiences of those before them to make sense of
testimony and motivations. Even when women were excluded
from jury service, for example, Anglo-American tradition pro-
vided for the use of midwife juries on occasions in which knowl-
edge of pregnancy or childbirth would be critical to a reliable
judgment.18 Perhaps that practice also reflected some delicacy of
feeling about whose ears should hear such intimate female mat-
ters; perhaps the practice embodied a notion of expertise rather
than impartiality. 19
Certainly arguments for the inclusion of women and African-
Americans on juries have long encompassed the view that female
and African-American litigants deserved the chance to be eval-
uated by those with shared experiences. 20 Some commonality is
necessary to know enough to judge. Admittedly, this argument
blends into the notion of a fair cross-section of the community
regarded as an independently important concern about the jury.
Both the appearance of fairness and the fact of equality in the
jury selection process matter even apart from issues about what
knowledge is necessary to judge fairly. But the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that impartiality is served by juries that
17. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 391
(1978).
18. See LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 128-29 (2d
ed. 1988).
19. Cf. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1912 n.121 (1988) (proferring differences between
male and female judgments as explanation of exclusion and inclusion of women on juries).
20. See Douglas Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohi-
bition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1990);
Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 80 (1986).
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represent a fair cross-section of the larger society.21 Although
the distribution of knowledge and experience may not be equal,
the collective deliberation process by a jury that is a fair cross-
section will temper the dangers of ignorance. 22
A confluence of the goals of fair representation and impartiality
thus exists. Both include a basic idea about the distribution of
experiences necessary to render fair judgments. The Clarence
Thomas of September who sought to establish his impartiality,
therefore, announced that he would retain his experiences of
poverty and racial discrimination and his "'underlying concerns
and feelings about people being left out, about our society not
addressing all the problems of people.' "23 Only a year earlier,
David Souter had felt the need to convey to the Senate and to
the watching public that despite a life as a bachelor and loner,
he had women friends24 and that once as a college adviser he
had even counseled a young woman who contemplated an abor-
tion.2s Experience and familiarity with human emotions bring a
judge or juror within the circle of people entitled and equipped
to judge others. More particularly, both Thomas and Souter
sought to establish that they had experiences with points of view
not well represented at the high court. This reflects an admission
that the Court's impartiality is threatened if it appears, because
of its own narrow membership, to lack an understanding of the
broad range of people who come before it.
A third kind of bias remains. It is perhaps the most elusive to
state, and it also may be controversial to discuss. I want to
explore it because I myself am suspicious of dualities. I am
troubled by the suggestion that bias may arise when one is too
close to but not when one is too far from a problem; but I am
equally troubled by the idea that these two are the only dimen-
sions that matter. Let us consider another dimension. Although
21. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990). But see id. at 495 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the fair cross-section requirement serves purposes different
from impartiality).
22. This goal may be jeopardized by extremely long trials, because a cross-section of
the population is unlikely to be able to disengage from other commitments to serve on
a jury for such a trial. For this reason, among others, some have proposed breaking long
trials into smaller parts that can be heard by different panels, as Judge Robert Keeton
has suggested to me in conversation.
23. Greenhouse, supra, note 1, at A19 (quoting Judge Clarence Thomas).
24. See, e.g., Alan McConagha, Souter's First Love: His Work, WASH. TImEs, July 26,
1990, at A6.
25. Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Souter Declines Comment on Abortion: Nominee
Moves to Dispel Image as Judge Lacking Compassion, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1990, at Al.
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someone may seem unbiased and removed from a matter, he or
she may be implicated and seem not to be because of unexamined
assumptions about the baseline used to judge neutrality and
impartiality.
Consider a case involving a charge of sex discrimination against
a law firm. In one such case, the defendant law firm asked Judge
Constance Baker Motley to recuse herself from the case because
she, as a black woman who had once represented plaintiffs in
discrimination cases, would identify with those who suffer race
or sex discrimination.26 The defendant invoked the notion that
the judge would be too close to the case. The defendant assumed
that Judge Motley's personal identity and her past legal work
deprived her of impartiality. Judge Motley declined to recuse
herself and explained:
[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all
of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law
firm or public service backgrounds. 27
Similarly, Judge Leon Higginbotham once was asked to remove
himself from a race discrimination case because he is an African-
American.2 In declining, he noted that "black lawyers have
litigated in the federal courts almost exclusively before white
judges, yet they have not urged that white judges should be
disqualified on matters of race relations. ' 29
Judge Motley and Judge Higginbotham may be understood to
suggest that they are no more too close to the matter than
judges of a different race or sex might be too far from it. Yet
they both advance a different view of bias and impartiality. They
mean to expose the assumption that the neutral baseline against
which to evaluate bias is the vantage point of a white male. They
mean to show that even whites and males have a vantage point
that can and should be evaluated for bias. Departure from a
white male perspective, however, does not necessarily mean bias.
Judge Motley and Judge Higginbotham mean to demand a more
particularized showing of bias than an assertion of sex or race,
26. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. Id. at 4.
28. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155,
156-57 (EfD. Pa. 1974).
29. Id. at 177.
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and also to remind any who need reminding that men as well as
women have a sex, and whites as well as blacks have a race.
These categories implicate us all. If being implicated means bias,
then everyone is biased, and perhaps then no one can judge.
That result is unacceptable, but it helps suggest a norm of
inclusion to govern who may serve as judge or jury. It points
out the danger of considering an initial appearance of bias without
probing how others may be similarly but more subtly implicated
in the issue of bias.
Consider a problem chosen not at random-a case arising from
a charge of sexual harassment. If brought before a woman judge
or before women jurors some might worry about biased decision-
makers. If the decisionmaker herself were a victim of sexual
harassment, some might worry that she would be unduly inclined
to believe and favor the complainant. As polls conducted during
Clarence Thomas's Senate hearings demonstrate, women who
have been harassed may instead be skeptical of another woman's
claims.30 Perhaps the complainant did not respond the way the
adjudicator did or would have; perhaps the complainant appears
disloyal or otherwise blameworthy in the eyes of the adjudicator.
These alternatives simply point to the multiple directions that
bias may take, but not to its absence. Would restricting decision-
making to a man or group of men be any better? Some people
worried that Anita Hill's charges were not taken seriously enough
by the Senate Judiciary Committee in part because the Commit-
tee was composed entirely of men who seemed not to comprehend
the seriousness of the problem.31 Some argue that the presence
of even just one woman Senator would have made a difference
on this score.3 2 This is an asserted connection between notions
of fair representation or cross-section and the impartiality nec-
essary to judge the significance of a charge.
But a different line of criticism can be applied to a panel of
male adjudicators of sexual harassment claims. Those adjudica-
tors might identify with the accused and might worry about
30. Felicity Barringer, The Thomas Confirmation: Hill's Case Is Divisive to Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10.
31. See, e.g., Carol Kleiman, After Senate's Thomas-Hill Debate, Two Women Seek Entry
to Men's Club, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1992, at 5.
32. See id. The confidence with which this point is uttered is challenged somewhat by
the position of Senator Nancy Kassebaum, who voted in favor of confirming Clarence
Thomas when the question reached the full Senate. Nevertheless, unlike some of her
male colleagues, Senator Kassebaum also refused to be "a party to an intellectual witch
hunt against Professor Hill." The Thomas Confirmation: Women in Senate Have Their Say
Before the Vote Confirming Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A18.
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being accused themselves. They might worry about false accu-
sations and the difficulty of rebutting them. They might worry
about true accusations, yet not believe them serious enough to
warrant public sanction. They also might worry about true ac-
cusations and seek to show their ability to overcome any ap-
pearance of bias by coming down hard on the accused.
I do not mean to suggest that everyone is equally or identically
biased. I do mean to suggest that commonplace notions of being
too close or too far from the parties or the problem at hand
inadequately capture the issue of bias. Instead, people's multiple
perspectives on a problem may diverge in different ways from
the ideal of impartiality. For that very reason, a collaborative
decisionmaking process involving people reflecting those multiple
perspectives exhibits the special virtue of a jury or multijudge
panel compared with a single judge. The value of consultation is
enhanced not merely by the presence of more than one mind but
also by the presence of more than one vantage point.3 This is
another way of saying that fair representation and impartiality
converge.
II. CRITICIZING THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Hernandez v. New
York4 provides an occasion to test these comments and in turn,
to test the Supreme Court. In Hernandez, the prosecution tried
a case against a Latino criminal defendant and used its peremp-
tory challenges to exclude jurors who failed to assure the pros-
ecutor adequately that they could defer to the official English
translation of any Spanish-language testimony.35 The defendant
claimed that the resulting jury violated equal protection guar-
antees because it effectively excluded all Spanish-proficient ju-
rors. 6
The case sharply divided the Supreme Court.37 Four Justices
signed the plurality opinion in which Justice Kennedy reasoned
33. A single judge can try to engage in an imaginative dialogue with people with
different vantage points on the problem at hand. Cf HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST
AND FUTURE: SIX EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 220-21 (1961) (suggesting that judgment
derives its validity from agreement of individuals with various perspectives).
34. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (plurality opinion).
35. Id. at 1864-65. The prosecution also used its peremptory challenges to exclude
jurors with family members who had been convicted of crimes. Id. at 1864.
36. Id. at 1866-67.
37. Four members of the Court signed Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, id. at 1864,
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that the prosecutor offered explanations for his challenges, ex-
planations sufficiently unrelated to race, and that thus no inten-
tional discrimination occurred.38 These Justices did not rely on
the view that ethnicity or language proficiency are unrelated to
race. They could have relied on the fact that many people who
speak Spanish are not Latinos and that many Latinos do not
speak Spanish, but they did not.39 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's
opinion includes a rather remarkable statement about the close
relationships between language and identity and between lan-
guage and ethnicity, close enough at times to justify equal pro-
tection scrutiny on the basis of language proficiency. 40 To reject
the defendant's claim, therefore, Justice Kennedy's opinion had
to reason that a prima facie showing of an equal protection
violation had been rebutted by the absence of proof that the
prosecutor intended to exclude based on race.4'
The plurality argued more specifically that the prosecutor had
offered a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges: the
Latino jurors raised doubts for the prosecutor when they hesi-
tated before they answered that they would try to defer to the
official English translation of Spanish testimony at the trial.42
This doubt, the plurality claimed, was unrelated to race or eth-
nicity. Some Latinos would give no such grounds for doubt, and
some non-Latinos would. Thus, the plurality found that the ex-
clusions were not based on race.4 3
But let us examine the exclusions more closely. Why would it
be legitimate to worry about a juror who could not ignore
testimony given by witnesses, and not therefore need to defer
solely to a court translator's version? Two linked reasons might
be at stake. This Spanish-proficient juror might base judgment
on information unavailable to other jurors and this juror might
two members signed another opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, id. at 1873, Justice
Stevens wrote a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, id. at 1875, and Justice Blackmun
dissented separately while indicating agreement with one part of Justice Stevens's dissent,
id. at 1875.
38. Id. at 1866-67.
39. The plurality opinion did reject the defendant's claim that a close correlation
between Spanish proficiency and Latino identity would be sufficient to treat exclusion of
Spanish-proficient jurors as exclusions of Latinos. Yet the plurality acknowledged that,
at least in this case, the exclusion of Spanish-proficient jurors had the effect of excluding
virtually all Latinos. Id. at 1867.
40. Id. at 1868.
41. Id. at 1868-69.
42. I& at 1864-65.
43. Id. at 1867.
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claim special knowledge and authority in the course of the jury
deliberations. Why are these worrisome instead of desirable traits
for a juror? These worries arise only if one supposes:
(1) that the normal juror would not know Spanish;
(2) that only the official English translation of Spanish testi-
mony should be used in the jury's deliberations;
(3) that people who do not speak Spanish adequately can fairly
judge people who do; and
(4) that the exclusion of Latinos from the jury leaves a jury
that can be perceived as fair and impartial in a case involving a
Latino defendant (and, in this case, Latino victims as well).
Underscoring these suppositions is Justice Kennedy's endorse-
ment of the trial court's conclusion that, because Latino jurors
might be sympathetic to both the Latino defendant and to the
Latino victims and witnesses, it is not discriminatory to exclude
Latino jurors; the sympathies wash out.44 This view neglects not
only Latinos in the community who view trial participation as a
civic right but also ignores all those troubled by the omission of
an entire perspective and knowledge base from the jury. More-
over, it also wrongly implies that only Latinos have sympathies
in cases involving Latinos.
Treating only Spanish-speaking Latinos as a problem, the plu-
rality cited a case "which illustrates the sort of problems that
may arise where a juror fails to accept the official translation of
foreign-language testimony."45 In United States v. Perez,46 a juror
asked the judge if it would be possible to ask the translator
about the meaning of a particular term. The translator had
interpreted the word to mean a public bar although the juror
thought it meant a restroom. The judge indicated that'questions
could be put only to the judge, not to the interpreter. The
interpreter nonetheless volunteered that jurors "are not to listen
to the Spanish but to the English. I am a certified court inter-
preter. 47 At this point, the transcript produced by the court
reporter indicated that the juror called the translator an "idiot."48
The juror later explained, however, that she had said, "It's an
idiom."4 9 (We have several layers of interpretation problems here!)
The juror was dismissed from the jury.50
44. Id. at 1871-72 (deferring to the trial court's finding).
45. Id. at 1867 n.3 (citing United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981)).
46. 658 F.2d 654.
47. Id. at 662.
48. Hermandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
49. Id.
50. Id-
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This episode, offered by Justice Kennedy as evidence of the
sort of problems that may arise when a juror fails to accept the
official translation of foreign-language testimony, may also indi-
cate the sorts of problems that arise when the trial process fails
to accommodate people who are bilingual. The juror's question
was treated as an intrusion rather than as an effort to get at
the truth; the witness's testimony, she suggested, would make
more sense if it referred to a restroom rather than a bar. The
court interpreter reacted defensively, and the judge responded
by banishing the inquiring juror from the trial.
This story contrasts sharply with a case in which a man got
into a fight in a bar with another man and killed him.5' Both men
were Mexican-Americans. The offender argued that his victim
had given him "el ojo," meaning, "the eye. '52 At that time, no
Mexican-Americans were eligible to serve on juries in Texas,
where the incident occurred.3 The defendant was convicted of
murder. As one observer noted about the case:
"Anglos have a big thing about eye contact being something
positive. You can take a man's measure by making contact....
Hell, in the Mexican community eye contact can kill you. It
sends the other guy a message that says what the hell are
you lookin' at, and if you don't like it, do something about it.
In a bar that can lead to a killing. But if you don't know that
you can't relate to what it means. And unless jurors understand
the difference between el ojo and eye contact, the defendant
is not being tried by a jury of his peers."
The Supreme Court of the United States essentially agreed.
In 1954, the Supreme Court-the same Court that decided Brown
v. Board of Education" -reversed the conviction. 56 The Court was
composed of Justices quite different from those serving on the
present Court. The present Court has moved away from recog-
nizing language, ethnic, and racial differences as important di-
mensions of American life and dimensions to be integrated
throughout our institutions. Instead, the Court seems to fear
differences and to desire to exclude those people it fears. Because
51. See Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952), rev'd sub noma.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
52. THOMAS WEYR, HISPANIC U.S.A.: BREAKING THE MELTING POT 83 (1988).
53. Hernandez, 251 S.W.2d at 533.
54. WEYR, supra note 52, at 83 (quoting Gilbert Pompa).
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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Spanish-speakers soon will probably become a majority in parts
of California and Texas, 57 these exclusions would be carried out
in the name of a minority mistaken about the actual norm.
What if the Supreme' Court instead exposed for discussion the
assumption that English-speaking and not bilingual jurors are
the norm? Even in last year's case, a majority of the Justices,
in separate opinions, considered ways to change the jury to
accommodate bilingual jurors. Six of the nine Justices proposed
that jurors proficient in a language used by witnesses be given
an opportunity to indicate to the judge any problems they detect
with the translations." The plurality acknowledged the "harsh
paradox that one may become proficient enough in English to
participate in trial," given the English-language ability require-
ments for federal jury service, "only to encounter disqualification
because he knows a second language as well."59 Nevertheless, for
these Justices, the treatment of bilingual jurors remained a
marginal concern, largely relegated to footnotes. The assumption
that the non-Spanish speaking juror is the impartial decision-
maker contributed to this failure. The problem of bias for juries
and for judges arises not only when they are too close to or too
far from those they judge but also when they fail to identify an
entrenched and biased assumption about whose perspective is
the norm.
The arguments for a jury that is a fair cross-section of the
community only strengthen this critique. 60 To be perceived as
fair by the entire community, to accord all citizens a chance to
serve as jurors, and to grant parties the opportunity to be heard
by their peers, the jury should reflect a fair cross-section of the
community. Such a cross-section is more likely to bring to bear
knowledge critical to evaluating evidence, credibility, and justice
in a given case.
57. See, e.g., Lily Eng & Bob Schwartz, City's Latinos on the Grow, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
26, 1991, at B1; cf. Product Development Needed for Growing Hispanic Population, UPI,
July 21, 1988 (noting that one in four Texans will be Hispanic by the year 2000), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
58. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 1877
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1872.
60. Those arguments include the rights of the parties to be evaluated by a jury of
their peers, the rights of potential jurors to serve, and the prerequisites for public
confidence in the process of trial. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 495 (1990) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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III. PREJUDICE VS. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
In case I seem to have implied that bias and prejudice are not
problems for juries and judges, let me turn to a distinction
between prejudice and prior knowledge. I believe that an impor-
tant distinction does exist. Prejudice interferes with impartiality.
Prior knowledge may assist impartiality, however, if coupled with
a willingness to be surprised, rather than always confirmed. Let
me offer into evidence a short story by James Baldwin, entitled
Sonny's Blues.61
It is a story of two brothers, both African-American. One
brother, the narrator, served in the Army and then became a
high school math teacher, a husband, and a father. His younger
brother, Sonny, became a heroin addict, a convicted felon, and a
jazz pianist.62 The school teacher ignored Sonny during the initial
period of Sonny's incarceration. But when the teacher's daughter
dies of polio, Sonny writes him a heartfelt letter.6 They then
stay in touch, and when Sonny is released, they reunite. But the
teacher is wary, concerned that Sonny will continue to use drugs.
He simultaneously feels guilty and worries that he is not fulfilling
his mother's last wish that he watch out for his brother.6 Sonny
tells his brother he knows that he may start using drugs again.65
Reluctantly, the teacher accepts Sonny's invitation to join him
at a nightclub. For the first time, he hears Sonny play the piano. 66
It is Sonny's first return to the instrument since his time in
prison. The teacher-narrator notes: "All I know about music is
that not many people ever really hear it. And even then, on the
rare occasions when something opens within, and the music
enters, what we mainly hear, or hear corroborated, are personal,
private, vanishing evocations" different from what is evoked for
the person making the music.67 Drenched with his prior knowl-
61. James Baldwin, Sonny's Blues, in How WE LIVE: CONTEMPORARY LIFE IN CONTEM-
PORARY FICTION 747 (Penney Chapin Hills & L. Rust Hills eds., 1968).
62. Id. at 748-50, 761-62.
63. Id. at 751.
64. His mother had said, "'It ain't only the bad ones, nor yet the dumb ones that gets
sucked under,'" id. at 756, and then she told him about his uncle who had been lynched,
id. at 757. She said, "'You got to hold on to your brother ...and don't let him fall, no
matter what it looks like is happening to him and no matter how evil you gets with
him.'" Id. at 757-58. She added, "'You may not be able to stop nothing from happening.
But you got to let him know you's there."' Id. at 758.
65. Id. at 768.
66. Id. at 769.
67. Id. at 770.
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edge and suspicion of Sonny, and with feelings of guilt, the
narrator still tries to discern what Sonny feels as he plays. He
begins to recognize the dialogue between Sonny and the musician
playing the bass fiddle. The bass player "wanted Sonny to leave
the shoreline and strike out for the deep water. He was Sonny's
witness that deep water and drowning were not the same thing-
he had been there, and he knew."6 The narrator watches his
brother move from absence to real presence with the other
musicians and then join them in finding new ways to make the
audience listen to the not-new story of human suffering.69 The
narrator is brought to his own memories but also to a new
respect for his brother, a man who chose not the norms of middle-
class respectability, but expression of human experience through
the blues.
The narrator is not asked to judge Sonny, although he does
so. Nonetheless, the story suggests the difference between pre-
judging a matter, even when prejudice is based on actual knowl-
edge, and the use of prior knowledge as part of a process of
opening up to the possibility of surprise. The story suggests the
difference between mulling over personal, private evocations and
attending to the situation of another person. The story also
suggests that, initially, the shared past and experiences of the
two brothers stand as a barrier to mutual understanding. Later,
however, the narrator is able to integrate his memories of his
parents and his brother into a new understanding and respect
for the path Sonny takes. It may be too much to suggest that
we are all brothers and sisters in this way, although such an
attitude need not interfere with impartiality if we try to use
what we know to remain open to surprises about one another. I
have used this story in teaching judges70 and often asked these
questions: "If you were asked to sentence Sonny in a new drug
charge, would you want to know about the piano playing? Would
you want to hear it? Would you want to include as judges and
juries people who know Sonny's world or only people with no
knowledge of it? Is there anyone who is not implicated in it?"
Let me contrast this story with the recent movie Thelma &
Louise.71 Two women plan a weekend away from the men in their
68. Id.
69. Id. at 771.
70. See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1689-95 (1990).
71. THELMA & LOUISE (MGM-Pathe 1991).
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lives, but they quickly find trouble at a honky-tonk. A man starts
dancing with Thelma, then makes sexual advances toward her.
When she resists, he violently starts to rape her. Louise appears
with a gun, the man stops, but he shows no remorse, and Louise
kills him. The rest of the movie follows their journey as outlaws,
trying to escape legal repercussions. The movie includes their
encounter with a truck driver who repeatedly makes gross sexual
advances toward them and their fantasy revenge against him.
The movie concludes with their suicide in a world aiming to
capture and punish them, a world they do not believe could
understand them.
The film triggered considerable press. In Boston, the Globe ran
side-by-side columns: A woman's review was entitled, She Loves
It; 72 a man's review: He Hates It. 73 The Boston Globe has its own
problems of perspective. A common prediction about that paper
is that if a nuclear bomb fell on New York, the headline in the
Boston Globe would read: "Hub Man Injured in Explosion."7 4 But
the issue of perspective is unusually pronounced in evaluations
of the movie Thelma & Louise. Some charge the movie with
stereotyping men and giving bad role models for women. Others
cheer its depiction of women fighting back in a world they find
unsafe and inhospitable. Perhaps only a law professor would like
best a particular line in the movie. It is uttered as the two
women discuss how police and prosecutors would not understand
how a woman who danced with a man could establish his sexual
advances were unwanted. Thelma says, "Law is some tricky
shit." s That statement summarizes the conviction that the male-
dominated legal system will not understand how a woman could
charge rape after she flirted with a man or how a woman could
be excused or forgiven for killing a man after he had stopped
raping a woman. Perhaps the polarized reviews confirm their
doubt. In a way, Anita Hill's experience could be described as
"Thelma and Louise Meet the Supreme Court Nomination Proc-
ess-and Discover How Unsafe and Inhospitable the Senate is
from a Woman's Point of View."
I put the film forward here for a different reason. I wonder
whether the film, like the story, Sonny's Blues, asks us to use
72. Diane White, She Loves It, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1991, at 29.
73. John Robinson, He Hates It, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1991, at 29.
74. "Hub" is the Globe's abbreviation for Boston as the hub of the universe. See Ask
the Globe, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1990, at 60.
75. THELMA & LouISE, supra note 71.
1216 [Vol. 33:1201
BIAS AND IMPARTIALITY OF JUDGES AND JURORS
what we know but to suspend our conclusions long enough to be
surprised, to learn. One of the actresses who starred in Thelma
& Louise said that people who find that the film mistreats men
are identifying with the wrong characters. 76 She invites all view-
ers to identify with the journey of self-discovery and self-criticism
undertaken by Thelma and Louise. They know they have done
something wrong, and the film- does not excuse them. But it
invites understanding and wagers that gender is no obstacle to
that. None of us can know anything except by building upon,
challenging, responding to what we already have known, what
we see from where we stand. But we can insist on seeing what
we are used to seeing, or else we can try to see something new
and fresh. The latter is the open mind we hope for from those
who judge, but not the mind as a sieve without prior reference
points and commitments. We want judges and juries to be ob-
jective about the facts and-the questions of guilt and innocence
but committed to building upon what they already know about
the world, human beings, and each person's own implication in
the lives of others. Pretending not to know risks leaving unex-
amined the very assumptions that deserve reconsideration.
IV. PREJUDICE, PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, AND THE SUPREME COURT
This prompts me, once more, to consider the situation of Justice
Clarence Thomas, both as judge and as someone to be judged.
Three versions of what has happened to him have emerged:
(1) The Republican story, put most cogently by the nominee
himself, of a high-tech lynching, a process spun out of control
through the manipulations of liberal interest groups, Senate staff
members, and ambitious press people who conspired to produce
a charge of sexual harassment, delay its evaluation, leak it at
the eleventh hour, and prompt a circus-like hearing besmirching
Thomas's good name.
(2) The Democratic story of a terrible process, but one with no
better alternative, because the Constitution calls upon the Senate
to advise and consent to presidential nominations, because the
complainant's demand for confidentiality delayed consideration of
the charge of harassment, and because an unfortunate leak to
the press brought to public attention this serious charge and
required public resolution.
76. See Judith Michaelson, Doumright Serious: With "Thelma & Louise," Geena Davis
Is Forging a New Image, Closer to Her Own Reality of a Woman Who Takes Care of Her
Life, L.A. TmIES, May 12, 1991, at 5 (quoting Geena Davis).
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(3) The baptism-by-fire theory, according to which we have
witnessed a process of intensive job training, with the result that
Clarence Thomas may end up emphatically defending privacy,
and the rights of the accused. He criticized racial stereotypes
and concluded that his own integrity mattered more than ambi-
tion-in contrast to positions he had taken previously.
I want to believe the third story, and Thomas himself has
testified to it.77 But he has also indicated his fury at the Senate,
his disdain for liberal interest groups and, it seems, apparent
disrespect for many Democrats and press people. 8 To some
observers, he seems untrustworthy on questions of sexual har-
assment, perhaps even a lying perpetrator.
Will Thomas now recuse himself from cases of sexual harass-
ment? From cases involving liberal interests groups or Demo-
cratic Senators? These matters will remain with his conscience.
To be fair, we should not use our metaphoric peremptory chal-
lenges against him. But to earn the respect of the public, he
must indicate how he will draw on the parts of his past that he
claimed taught him about people left out, disadvantaged, and
misunderstood. It would help if he worked to prompt other
Justices to make explicit the assumptions they take for granted
about whose perspective is neutral and whose is biased. It would
help if he does not strip himself down like a runner, but instead
acknowledges his own situation as a brother79 implicated in the
lives of others and able to be surprised while he builds upon
what he already knows.
77. See Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Swearing-In: After Ordeal of Senate Confirmation,
Views on Thomas's Court Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at 8.
78. See Peter G. Gosselin, Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13,
1991, at 1.
79. Thomas's treatment of his sister in a speech commenting on her dependency on
Aid to Families with Dependent Children gave some critics another ground for attack,
because he seemed to register callous disregard for her difficult times, ignorance about
the gender difference that had contributed to their contrasting life stories, and reckless-
ness with the truth. See Joel F. Handler, The Judge and His Sister: Growing up Black,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at A20 (letter to the Editor).
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